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Essentialist Reasoning and Knowledge Effects on
Biological Reasoning in Young Children
Patricia A. Herrmann The University of Texas at Austin
Jason A. French Northwestern University
Ganie B. DeHart State University of New York (SUNY)–Geneseo
Karl S. Rosengren Northwestern University

Biological kinds undergo a variety of changes during their life span, and these
changes vary in degree by organism. Understanding that an organism, such as a
caterpillar, maintains category identity over its life span despite dramatic changes
is a key concept in biological reasoning. At present, we know little about the
developmental trajectory of children’s understanding of dramatic life-cycle changes
and how this might relate to their understanding of evolution. We suggest that this
understanding is a key precursor to later understanding of evolutionary change.
Two studies examined the impact of age and knowledge on children’s biological
reasoning about living kinds that undergo a range of natural life-span changes—
from subtle to dramatic. The participants, who were 3, 4, and 7 years old, were
shown paired pictures of juvenile and adult animals and asked to endorse biological
or nonbiological causal mechanisms to account for life-span change. Additionally,
reasoning of 3- and 4-year-old participants was compared before and after exposure to caterpillars transforming into butterflies. The results are framed in terms of a
developmental trajectory in essentialist reasoning, a cognitive bias that has been
associated with difficulties in understanding and accepting evolution.

Life-cycle changes can be both subtle and dramatic. For some species,
growth involves primarily morphological changes that subtly turn a
cuddly kitten into a full-grown cat over a period of months. In contrast,
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the maturation of a monarch caterpillar involves growing larger and then
undergoing a dramatic transformation into an adult form that varies in size,
color, and shape. Between these two extremes are organisms such as birds,
whose life-cycle changes involve a shift in color and texture as the furry,
gray down of a gosling gives rise to the snowy white feathers of a swan.
To what extent are children of different ages sensitive to these variations in
changes that occur over species’ life spans? And to what extent do children
of different ages view these as natural biological changes?
These issues are important because by examining how children think
about these kinds of biological changes we may gain insight into how they
reason about changes in species over time. Thus, we suggest that an understanding that individuals can change dramatically over their life cycles
as part of natural, biological processes may be an important precursor to
grasping key concepts related to evolution, such as variation. If children
are unwilling to accept instances of possible biological change, such as
tadpoles turning into frogs, it is unclear how they could ever grasp the
concept of species change over time, which involves equally dramatic
changes in appearance and structure.
Examining children’s knowledge of these types of natural changes
may be particularly informative for examining essentialist reasoning in
children, a type of reasoning that may dominate young children’s and even
adults’ thinking (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Psychological
essentialism is a belief that membership in a category is defined by an
unseen, causal property or essence (Medin & Ortony, 1989). This form
of reasoning has been viewed as a barrier to both children’s and adults’
understanding of evolution by causing participants to overlook individual
differences within a species (Coley & Muratore, 2012; Gelman & Rhodes,
2012; Shtulman & Calabi, 2012).
Whereas the dramatic change of a caterpillar’s metamorphosis into
a butterfly occurs in the natural world, there are many species that do
not undergo natural dramatic change. Kittens do not shed their fur, grow
feathers and wings, and become birdlike creatures (Keil, 1989; Rips,
1989). No natural biological mechanism can render these changes. This
kind of information regarding which changes are typical and which are
atypical is an important aspect of category knowledge about biological
entities. Nontypical and potentially impossible changes violate our understanding of what constitutes categories of familiar animals. Gaining more
insight into how children reason about category membership, the types of
change they believe are biologically possible, and whether children treat
the boundaries between species as permeable or impenetrable may lead to
new insights about why the concept of evolution is so difficult for many
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children and adults to understand and accept (Legare, Lane, & Evans,
2013; Rosengren, Brem, Evans, & Sinatra, 2012).
The goal of this study is to investigate how children of different ages
reason about biological and nonbiological mechanisms of change. We are
particularly interested in examining whether children’s reasoning about
life-span change as a biological process is influenced by the extent of
change (e.g., physical growth and metamorphosis). We also ask to what
degree children invoke essentialism as they reason about life-span change.
Aspects of life-span change, particularly metamorphosis and sexual dimorphism, are two biological phenomena that ultimately led to the decline of
essentialist models in formal biological theories (Mayr, 1982). It may be
that, similarly, dramatic life-span change is initially difficult for children
to incorporate into an essentialism-based theory of biological change. An
important question is how children incorporate notions of dramatic change
into their conceptual frameworks and how this relates to potentially deep
commitments to essentialism (Gelman, 2003). We are particularly interested in examining how children’s reasoning about these kinds of changes
might be influenced by age and increases in knowledge. In the second
half of our report, we explore how new knowledge of a particular type of
dramatic change—metamorphosis—influences children’s reasoning about
biological change more generally.
We begin with a brief review of current perspectives on psychological
essentialism. We then examine age and knowledge effects on reasoning
about biological kinds and then describe the specific hypotheses of our study.

Psychological Essentialism
Essentialism, the notion that properties and characteristics of natural kinds
stem from an underlying reality or “essence,” has a long history in philosophy (Aristotle, 1924/1953; James, 1890/1983; Locke, 1671/1959) and
biological science (Mayr, 1982). More recently, psychologists have viewed
essentialism as a bias or constraint that influences the manner in which
children and adults reason about a wide range of phenomena in the world
(Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Bloom,
2010; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Hood & Bloom, 2008;
Medin & Ortony, 1989). Proponents of psychological essentialism contend
that the naïve biological theories of both children and adults incorporate the
ideas that (a) all living things have an underlying essence, (b) this essence
defines category membership, and (c) the essence is transmitted from
parents to offspring (Ahn et al., 2001; Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Ware,
2012; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Sousa, Atran, & Medin, 2002).
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The essentialist perspective just outlined is not without its critics.
Some researchers suggest that children’s natural kind categories are derived
solely from observations of similarity (Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky,
Kloos, & Fisher, 2007). Others have suggested that reasoning about biological kinds operates on the basis of principled causal theories, as opposed to
upon perceptual similarity, but that these principles need not take the form
of psychological essentialism (Rips, 2001; Strevens, 2000).
While we acknowledge this debate regarding psychological essentialism, we use an essentialist frame for the current study because of its
historical role in biology and especially in the understanding of evolution
(Mayr, 1982). Specifically, we explore developmental differences in children’s ability to categorize based on essences, or other nonobvious causal
properties, in the face of dramatic perceptual change. Conversely, we use
children’s reasoning about biological kinds that undergo dramatic life-span
change to shed light on their commitment to psychological essentialism.
Within the framework of psychological essentialism, Gelman and
colleagues (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Rhodes, 2012; Gelman & Ware,
2012) have articulated a set of core components related to essentialism.
Here we focus on two of these components of essentialism (a) the idea that
category identity is immutable in the face of changes to surface properties (Keil, 1989; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gottfried, Gelman, & Schultz,
1999; Johnson, 1990; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991;
Rosengren & Hickling, 2000) and (b) the idea that an essence gives rise
to an innate potential to develop along predestined pathways (Gelman &
Wellman, 1991; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1997; Taylor, 1996; Taylor, Rhodes,
& Gelman, 2009). This component is tied to the idea that the types of change
an entity can undergo are domain and mechanism specific (Aristotle, cited
in Wiggins, 1980; Keil, 1989; Rosengren et al., 1991; Schwartz, 1978). We
view an understanding of dramatic life-span changes as an important piece
of biological knowledge that may be very relevant to later understanding
of evolution. Once children accept this knowledge (e.g., that caterpillars
can turn into butterflies), they may be more willing to accept variation
between parents and offspring, which in turn may lead to an understanding
of species change. In this report, we examine the first part of this puzzle.
Researchers interested in psychological essentialism have generally
treated it as a cognitive bias that operates across the life span. To date,
little or no research has examined whether different components of essentialism emerge at different points or whether these components are influenced in important ways by knowledge and experience. In a cross-sectional
study, French, Herrmann, Rosengren, and Evans (under review) found that
certain components of essentialism (i.e., immutability, innate potential, and
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boundary intensification) emerge on different time courses, which suggests
that essentialist reasoning is influenced by knowledge. The current study
serves to both replicate this result by using a different task and stimuli
set and to extend it by specifically examining how the acquisition of new
knowledge might influence children’s reasoning about biological change.
If observational interventions are successful in influencing the extent of
change in appearance allowed by children, as well as their understanding
of underlying biological mechanisms, educational interventions that
encourage understanding of both within-species and across-species variation may be only a terrarium away.

Age-Related Changes and Knowledge Effects in
Biological Reasoning
Researchers have outlined extensively how children’s general biological
knowledge increases over childhood. Among the knowledge they acquire
are properties and capabilities of specific categories of animals (Carey,
1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 1991), awareness of plants’ status as living
things (Angorro, Waxman, & Medin, 2008; Richards & Siegler, 1986), and
knowledge of ecological and causal relations among species (Coley, Vitkin,
Seaton, & Yopchick, 2005).
For example, Carey (1985) found that kindergartners performing an
induction task with biological properties did not generalize properties to
only those animals that actually possessed them, but rather generalized
them broadly to living things. Specifically, children generalized properties such as “has bones,” which should be attributed only to vertebrates,
to both vertebrates and invertebrates. Seven-year-old children and adults,
however, restricted their generalization to vertebrates. Inagaki and Hatano
(1987, 1991) argue that older children’s ability to limit the properties they
transfer from humans to animals is due to increased knowledge of the biological world and of what phenomena specific biological kinds can undergo.
Although not designed explicitly to address the effects of knowledge
on essentialism, past research does suggest that gains in knowledge may
affect some of the essentialist biases under consideration in the current
studies. For example, a close look at past growth and transformation studies
reveals that, as children age, they are more likely to believe that category
identity can be stable over dramatic surface change (Keil, 1989), and that
dramatic changes in appearance can occur over the life span (Rosengren
et al., 1991). In Keil’s studies, when children were asked if a raccoon
was still a raccoon when externally transformed to resemble a skunk, the
youngest children denied that the animal was still a raccoon, and claimed
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that it was now a skunk (Keil, 1989). Similarly, when asked if a caterpillar
would turn into a butterfly or simply would increase in size over growth,
3-year-olds favored the caterpillar becoming larger. Interestingly, in both
cases, most of the researchers’ focus has been on older children’s willingness to reject that category membership changes with superficial changes
in appearance (as in Keil, 1989) and older children’s willingness to accept
that identity is preserved over natural biological metamorphosis (as in the
study by Rosengren et al., 1991). We argue that these changes in reasoning,
like those just mentioned, are likely not only due to increases in age and
general knowledge of the biological world but also to increases in knowledge about specific categories of biological kinds.
In one of the few studies to investigate explicitly the impact of direct
experience on children’s reasoning about biological kinds (see also Prokop,
Prokop, & Tunnicliffe, 2008), Inagaki (1990) examined the influence that
raising a goldfish has on children’s inductive generalizations. Children
who raised goldfish showed increased generalization from goldfish to
other biological kinds, compared to children who had not had this experience. This work reveals that category-specific knowledge, in addition
to a general essentialist bias, may drive categorization of and reasoning
about natural kinds. The current study examines essentialist beliefs and the
effects of category-specific knowledge in a cross-sectional experiment with
a follow-up intervention. We expected to see a shift based on increased
category knowledge in children’s reasoning on the basis of components
of essentialism—specifically, innate potential and category immutability—
for organisms that undergo dramatic change.

Types of Change
We suggest that a number of different biological changes generally occur as
part of natural life-span changes for different species, and here we describe
four types of change that are investigated in this study. The first type of
change is a naturalistic pattern of minimal growth that primarily involves an
increase in size along with the relatively minor morphological changes associated with growth (e.g., kitten to cat). This is the type of change that Lorenz
(1971) argued made humans feel affection towards animals that exhibit juvenile features (e.g., softer, smaller features, proportional differences) and is
used to model morphological changes in facial features for orthodontia and
facial reconstruction (Thompson, Krovitz, & Nelson, 2003). The second type
of change consists of a pattern of growth that also involves changes in color
and texture. For example, as a juvenile owl grows, the color and texture of its
feathers change, making this change more dramatic than the minimal growth
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pattern, but its basic features such as a beak and wings remain constant. The
third type of change is captured by classic metamorphosis. In this type of
change, color, texture, and shape all alter significantly during growth. For
example, a caterpillar undergoes a change to its body shape and acquires
wings as it transforms into a butterfly. These natural types of change that
occur over the life span of many biological organisms contrast with the
fourth type of change investigated—the impossible changes that cut across
typical category boundaries, such as a kitten morphing into an owl or a horse.
In the current study, we investigate children’s acceptance of
these different types of changes at three ages (3, 4, and 7). With 3- and
4-year-olds, we compared acceptance before and after experience with an
example of metamorphosis. We also examined whether children would
endorse both biological and nonbiological change for animals. In particular,
we contrasted innate potential and immutability (e.g., biological organisms
have to grow and change as part of the life cycle [Inagaki & Sugiyama,
1988]) with nonbiological mechanisms, such as magical change or change
brought about by desire.
Consistent with previous literature (Rosengren et al., 1991), we
predicted that children would be unlikely to endorse change in species
type regardless of the mechanism involved. We also predicted that children
would endorse natural biological change over nonbiological mechanisms of
change, but that 3- and 4-year-olds would show this pattern less frequently
than 7-year-olds. Finally, we predicted that direct exposure to caterpillars
changing into butterflies would increase young children’s use of biological
mechanisms, particularly for items that undergo dramatic life-span change.
In doing so, children may be provided with an early foundation for conceptualizing extensive evolutionary change over geological time. If children
can accept that dramatic life-span change is caused by biological mechanisms, they may more easily grasp that variation within species is caused
by biological mechanisms, and that this, over time, can lead to evolution.
Study 1
The current study examines the development of the propensity to use
biological versus nonbiological reasoning about life-span changes of
varying degrees. We predicted that children across age groups would
offer more biological than nonbiological responses to all changes, but that
3- to 4-year-olds, due to lack of experience with living kinds that undergo
dramatic change over the life span, would show less biological reasoning as
the life-span changes become more dramatic. On the other hand, based on
previous literature (e.g., Carey, 1985), 7-year-olds were expected to show
biological reasoning near ceiling for all types of change.
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Method

Participants
Twenty-six 3-year-olds (14 girls), ranging from 39 to 51 months (M = 47.2)
and twenty-four 4-year-olds (12 girls), ranging from 46 to 53 months
(M = 49.9), were recruited from a university laboratory preschool in a midsized
Midwestern community in the United States. Twenty-six first-graders (12 girls)
were recruited from a university-sponsored summer sports camp that drew
broadly from the community. Exact birth date information was not available
for these children, but all were in the 7-year-old range. As we expected these
children to be at ceiling on our task, we report on the data collected from them
even though we do not have a more precise measure of their age. The majority
of children were from White, middle-class backgrounds.

Materials
Materials included 20 laminated photographs depicting the juvenile or
adult forms of 10 different animal species drawn from a wide range on the
phylogenic scale (dog, cat, horse, duck, owl, frog, butterfly; see Table 1).

Table 1. Examples of the juvenile and target adult forms presented for each
type of change
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Design and Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet area of the child’s preschool by
using procedures adapted from Rosengren et al. (1991). The experimenter
began by familiarizing children with the difference between possible and
impossible events by saying, “Some things can happen like I could draw
on this piece of paper or walk out of this room. Other things can’t happen.
I can’t walk on the ceiling or turn this chair into a bird.” The experimenter
then introduced the task by saying, “Now I’m going to show you some
pictures of animals and ask you if the animals can change in different ways.”
Children participated in eight trials in which they were presented with a
juvenile form of an animal, followed by two adult forms, and were subsequently asked questions about each adult form. As can be seen in Table 1,
children were presented with juvenile and adult item sets that represented
four different patterns of change, described earlier—growth; growth with
texture and color changes; growth with texture, color, and shape changes;
and impossible species change. Within each pattern of change were two
juvenile-adult sets. Each set consisted of one juvenile and two adult items
so that children saw a total of 8 juvenile and 16 adult items throughout the
testing session. The item sets were presented in two orders, with children
randomly assigned to one of these orders.
At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter presented children
with a photograph of a juvenile animal, labeled with a unique proper name,
and said, “Okay, here is a picture of [e.g., Jimmy]. Jimmy looks like this
now.” The experimenter then produced a picture of one of the adult animals
and pointed to it, saying, “Could Jimmy ever change to look like this? Or
will he always look like this [pointing again to the first picture]?”Children
responded yes or no. In the three of the four patterns of change (growth,
growth with color and texture changes, growth with color texture and shape
changes), a response of yes was correct for one of the adult targets (i.e.,
puppy to dog) and incorrect for one of the adult targets (i.e., puppy to cat).
In the impossible species-change trials, a response of yes was incorrect for
either adult form (see Table 1).
For all trials, if the child responded yes, the experimenter asked five
yes-or-no follow-up questions: Two were related to biological reasoning
about the change living kinds undergo, and three were related to nonbiological (e.g., magical, psychological) ways of reasoning about the change
living kinds undergo. The biological questions were “Could Jimmy grow
up to look like that?” and “Does Jimmy have to change to look like that?”
Research by Rosengren and colleagues (1991) has shown that these questions
access biological reasoning, so we employed them here. Additionally, the
wording of these questions—“grow up” and “have to change”—examined
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children’s acceptance of innate potential and immutability of category
identity. The remaining three questions—“Could Jimmy turn into that by
eating special food?” “Could Jimmy turn into that because he really wanted
to?” and “Could someone else make Jimmy turn into that?”—were used
to assess children’s acceptance of nonbiological changes. The “special
food” question was designed to access magical reasoning about change,
the “wanted to” question was designed to access psychological reasoning
about change, and the “someone else make” question was designed to
access change brought about by intervention. After answering these questions about the first adult form, children were presented with the other adult
form, and the procedures were repeated. This was done for all eight trials.
The order in which the two adult forms were presented was counterbalanced within each trial.
Coding and analysis. For each affirmative response to the correct
adult target, participants were given 1 point. For each negative response to
the correct adult target (e.g., puppy becoming dog), participants received
no points. For each affirmative response to the incorrect adult target,
participants received no points. Last, for each negative response to the
incorrect adult target (e.g., puppy becoming cat), participants received
1 point. These scores were averaged to produce a correct adult score for
each type of change. A 1 was recorded for each mechanism of change
endorsed, and a 0 for each mechanism rejected. For each type of change,
the correct adult score and the responses to the essentialist mechanisms
(grow up, have to) were averaged to produce a biological reasoning score.
The responses to the three nonbiological mechanisms (special food,
want to, someone else make) were averaged to produce a nonbiological
reasoning score.
Results
Figure 1 presents the results of this study. To examine the effect of different
levels of change in children’s willingness to reason biologically about
living kinds, a 3 (Age: 3-, 4-, and 7-year-olds) × 2 (Reasoning: biological vs. nonbiological) × 4 (Type of Change: growth, growth & color/
texture, growth & color/texture & shape, and species) repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Reasoning and type
of change were within-subject measures. This analysis revealed main
effects for type of reasoning, F(1, 74) = 726.61, p < .001, η2 = .91, type
of change, F(3, 222) = 132.53, p < .001, η2 = .64, and age, F(2, 74) =
4.79, p = .01, η2 = .12. As seen in Figure 1, across ages and types of
change, children were more likely to endorse biological explanations
for change (M = .65, SE = .10) rather than nonbiological explanations of
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Figure 1. Study 1: 3-, 4-, and 7-year-olds’ use of biological and nonbiological
reasoning about different types of change in living kinds.

change (M = .22, SE = .02), p < .001. The main effect of type of change
revealed that children at all ages were much less likely to accept either
biological or nonbiological explanations for species level change (M = .26,
SE = .02) than any of the other types of change (MGrowth = .59, SEGrowth = .02;
MGrowth & T/C = .54, SEGrowth & T/C = .02; MGrowth & T/C & Shape = .52,
SEGrowth & T/C & Shape = .02), all ps < .001.
These results were moderated by a number of significant interactions. (All interactions were followed up with post hoc comparisons using
Bonferroni corrections.) We found a significant interaction between age
and reasoning, F(2, 74) = 25.60, p < .001, η2 = .41. Figure 1 shows that
3- and 4-year-olds exhibited similar patterns of theory endorsement and
reasoned biologically more than nonbiologically. However, 7-year-olds
(M = .12, SE = .03) were significantly less likely to endorse changes brought
about by nonbiological mechanisms than were the other two age groups
(M3-year-olds = .25, SE3-year-olds = .03; M4-year-olds = .30, SE4-year-olds = .03). As shown
to the left in the figure, 7-year-olds (M = .70, SE = .02) were also significantly more likely to endorse changes brought about by biological means
than were either 3- or 4-year-olds (both Ms = .62, SEs = .02), ps < .01.
The previous effects were moderated by a three-way interaction
between theory, type of change, and age, F(6, 222) = 5.52, p < .001, η2 = .13.
As predicted, children’s mean endorsement of biological mechanisms for
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texture, color, and shape changes increased with age. Figure 1 shows that
7-year-olds endorsed biological mechanisms at near ceiling levels for all
three types of possible change: growth (M = .95, SE = .03), growth & texture/
color change (M = .92, SE = .03), and growth & texture/color & shape change
(M = .94, SE = .03). The 3- and 4-year-olds, however, endorsed biological
explanations more for growth change (M3-year-olds = .76, SE3-year-olds = .03;
M4-year-olds = .88, SE4-year-olds = .03) than for growth & texture/color & shape
change (M3-year-olds = .64, SE3-year-olds = .03; M4-year-olds = .73, SE4-year-olds = .03),
both ps < .01. The three-way interaction also suggests that 4-year-olds
(M = .05, SE = .06) were significantly less likely to accept biological means of
species change than were 3-year-olds (M = .35, SE = .05), p < .01. This type
of change was also rarely accepted by 7-year-olds (M = 0.1, SE = .05). This
result suggests that 3-year-olds are more accepting of impossible kinds of
change than are older children. Another interesting result is that 3-year-olds
(M = .23, SE = .04) generally were less accepting of nonbiological change
involving growth and color/texture changes than were 4-year-olds (M = .42,
SE = .04), p < .01. This result can be seen on the right-hand side of Figure 1.
Taken together, these results reveal that children at all ages studied
favored biological over nonbiological processes when reasoning about the
changes that a living kind undergoes as it develops. Nonetheless, the type
of the biological change is important. While 7-year-olds endorsed biological reasoning at the same rate for all types of possible life-span changes,
3- and 4-year-olds were less likely to endorse biological means of change
for dramatic changes such as metamorphosis.
Discussion
As found in previous studies (e.g., Rosengren et al., 1991), children
as young as age 3 endorse biological reasoning about the growth of
living kinds over a variety of life-span changes and largely reject both
impossible changes (species change) and nonbiological mechanisms of
possible life-span change. Strikingly, these results also reveal important
differences between the biological reasoning of young and old children.
Namely, 7-year-olds endorse innate potential and immutability at equally
high levels for minimal and dramatic life-span changes, whereas 3- and
4-year-olds’ use of these principles drops off with the amount of change an
organism undergoes. For example, 7-year-olds were equally likely to say
that a caterpillar “would grow up to be” or “had to become” a butterfly as
they were to say a puppy “would grow up to be” or “had to become” a dog.
However, 3- and 4-year-olds were less likely to endorse such statements
about the caterpillar and butterfly pair than about the puppy and dog pair.
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It appears that young children are both less and more constrained
than older children in what types of change they are willing to accept.
For example, 3-year-olds are less constrained than older children in that
they accept species change and nonbiological changes at a higher rate
than do older children. At the same time, 3-year-olds are less likely to
accept biological changes in general than are older children. Compared
to 4-year-olds, 3-year-olds were also less likely to accept nonbiological
changes that involved growth combined with color/texture change, a type
of change that is common in birds and other species. What these results
suggest is that the types of change that children are willing to accept are
probably driven by their knowledge and experience with the biological
world. That is, between ages 3 and 4, children appear to be less willing
to accept changes across species and, by age 7, are generally unwilling
to accept nonbiological changes.
This cross-sectional investigation highlights age differences but
does not enable us to tease apart whether these are due to knowledge
gained or to some other developmental phenomena. In the next section,
we directly test the hypothesis that these developmental changes are
knowledge driven, by presenting children with an opportunity to witness
dramatic life-span change firsthand.
Study 2
This study both directly tests the possibility that early biological
reasoning is mediated by category knowledge and investigates the way
in which early, possibly essentialist biases constrain learning about the
biological world. Using similar stimuli and methods as in Study 1, we
conducted an intervention to examine how familiarity with the lifespan changes of a particular biological kind affects biological reasoning
about a range of kinds. Children in this study received firsthand experience with caterpillars and witnessed them undergo metamorphosis into
butterflies. The children also saw a pregnant mouse that gave birth to a
number of babies. If essentialist reasoning, particularly reasoning about
the innate potential of biological kinds, depends partly on knowledge of
life-span changes, we expect to see an increase in children’s biological
reasoning after this exposure. However, if these reasoning biases are
independent of knowledge about specific living kinds, then children’s
reasoning should show no change after the intervention. In this case, the
differences between young and old children in Study 1 might be attributed to some other developmental phenomena.
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Method

Participants
Fourteen of the twenty-six 3-year-olds (7 girls), ranging from 40 to 49
months (M = 46.4), and sixteen of the twenty-five 4-year-olds (8 girls),
ranging from 51 to 56 months (M = 53.0), who participated in Study
1 were randomly selected to participate in Study 2. Additionally, fourteen
participants (7 girls), ranging from 47 to 58 months (M = 52.14), from a
preschool in upstate New York, served as the control group. All participants were predominantly middle-class Whites.

Materials
Materials were identical to those used in Study 1, except that different
pictures of each species were used in the posttest.

Procedure
Pretest. The results of Study 1 served as the pretest data for the
experimental group.
Intervention. After all children had taken the pretest, experimenters
placed two glass terrariums in the their preschool classroom. The 3- and
4-year-olds were in adjoining classrooms, and the terrariums were placed
in the middle of the two so that both classrooms had access to them. One
contained painted lady caterpillars and the other contained a pregnant
mouse. Over a 2-week period, children witnessed the caterpillars go through
the stages of metamorphosis and become painted lady butterflies, and the
mouse gave birth to a dozen pups. Children were able to visit the terrariums
throughout the day and also drew pictures of the events in the terrariums
intermittently over the 2 weeks. When the butterflies emerged from their
cocoons, the teacher and children released them outdoors. While the terrariums were in the classroom, teachers were free to answer questions posed by
the children regarding the animals but were not explicitly asked to provide
any formal instruction about their growth, metamorphosis, or reproduction.
Control group. 1 Participants in the control group were given similar
pretest and posttest tasks as the experimental group. However, the

1. The control group was obtained from a different sample. Although the procedure used
was similar, we are cautious in our interpretation of the data.
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control group did not have any animals in the classroom for o bservation.
As with the experimental group, the stimuli received by the control
group modeled dramatic and nondramatic life-cycle changes, but the
control stimuli sets were different. The control group received 12 items
(i.e., 6 possible transformations and 6 impossible transformations). Half
of each of these transformations involved dramatic change, and half
involved nondramatic change (i.e., typical growth).
Posttest. The posttest for the experimental group was conducted
2 months after the pretest. The method was identical to the pretest
(Study 1), except that different photographs of each baby and adult
species were used to prevent familiarity effects with the previous photographs. For the control group, because of scheduling issues, the posttest was conducted 1 month after the pretest. If repeated exposure to
the stimuli explained the effect on the posttest scores, shorter intervals
between pretests and posttests would increase scores as longer intervals would reduce the familiarity effect of the stimuli. Thus, the shorter
interval of the control group can be considered a more conservative
approach to the experimental design.
Results
To test our hypothesis that the intervention would increase biological
reasoning and to assess the broadness of the intervention affect, we
conducted a 2 (Age: 3- and 4-year-olds) × 2 (Test Time: pre- and postintervention) × 2 (Reasoning: biological and nonbiological) × 4 (Type
of Change: growth, growth & color/texture change, growth & color/
texture & shape change, and species transformation) repeated-measures
ANOVA. Test time and type of change were within-participant factors.
The analysis revealed main effects of time, F(1, 28) = 6.93, p = .01,
η2 = .20, reasoning, F(1, 28) = 209.43, p < .001, η2 = .88, and type of
change, F(3, 84) = 155.04, p < .001, η2 = .85. We also tested for item
effects, which did not reach significance.
Figure 2 displays the main effects for reasoning, type of change, and
test time. As in Study 1, children were more likely to endorse biological
mechanisms of change (M = .63, SE = .01) than nonbiological mechanisms (M = .27, SE = .02), p < .01, and were more likely to endorse the
possible types of change (MGrowth = .61, SEGrowth = .02; MGrowth & T/C = .55,
SEGrowth & T/C = .02; MGrowth & T/C & Shape = .54, SEGrowth & T/C & Shape = .02) than the
impossible change (M = .10, SE = .03), all ps < .001. Children were also
generally more likely to endorse change at posttest (M = .48, SE = .02)
than at pretest (M = .42, SE = .01), p = .01.
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Figure 2. Study 2: children’s use of biological reasoning about types of change
before and after intervention. *p < .01; **p < . 001.

These main effects were moderated by an interaction among reasoning,
type of change, and test time, F(3, 84) = 3.27, p = .03, η2 = .10, also displayed
in Figure 2. This interaction was explored with post hoc comparisons with
Bonferroni correction. Whereas no differences were found in children’s
endorsement of nonbiological mechanisms, significant increases between
pretest and posttest were found in children’s use of biological mechanisms
for all three growth changes. Children’s responses to biological questions
increased for the baseline growth items (Mpre = .78, SEpre = .03; Mpost = .90,
SEpost = .03), p < .01, the growth & color/texture change items, (Mpre = .74,
SEpre = .03; Mpost = .84, SEpost = .03), p < .01, and the growth & color/texture
& shape change items (Mpre = .66, SEpre = .03; Mpost = .87, SEpost = .03),
p < .001. Responses to biological questions held steady, decreasing slightly,
for the impossible change items (Mpre = .19, SEpre = .06; Mpost = .08, SEpost =
.03), p = .13, signaling that children did not come to believe that any sort of
life-span change is possible as a result of the intervention.
To pursue our focus on the breadth of the effect of category-specific
information about biological changes, we conducted pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni correction, examining children’s essentialist
responses to the caterpillar and tadpole items at pretest and posttest.
The caterpillar was chosen because it closely resembled the caterpillars
children witnessed at intervention, thus providing a test for within-category
use of knowledge. The tadpole was chosen because it represents the same
type of change (growth & texture/color & shape) as the caterpillar and
allows us to ask whether children’s knowledge of the dramatic life-span
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changes possible for caterpillars generalizes across category boundaries.
Figure 3 reveals that, at pretest, children performed equally on the caterpillar (M = .65; SE = .04) and frog items (M = .68; SE = .04), p = .48, but
that children’s biological scores at posttest were significantly higher for
the caterpillar item (M = .92; SE = .04) than for the tadpole item (M = .82;
SE = .03), p = .04.

Control Group
At pretest, children in the control group got 8 of the 12 items correct and, at
posttest, children got 9 of 12 items correct. This difference was not significant. These results suggest that repeated testing does not lead to improved
performance.
Discussion
The results from Study 2 support our claim that an increase in knowledge
about biological kinds drives the increase in children’s belief in innate
potential and immutability when reasoning about the life-span changes of

Figure 3. Study 2: The effect of intervention on children’s endorsement of growth++
(growth and color/texture and shape change) for butterfly and frog items. *p < .05.
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biological organisms (seen in Study 1). The intervention resulted in a broad
increase in these beliefs across all possible types of life-span change and in a
special increase for the subject of the intervention, the caterpillar. However,
children did not begin to endorse species change, such as a kitten becoming
an owl. Furthermore, children’s endorsement of nonbiological mechanisms
(magical, psychological) did not increase, suggesting that children understood
the biological nature of the changes they witnessed during the intervention.
These results suggest that children learned both the necessity of growth
and the possibility of transformation over the life span rather than a rule
that any changes are possible. If children after the intervention had assumed
that any changes were possible, they would have begun to endorse species
change. Framed from the perspective of psychological essentialism, children’s learning was constrained by essentialist biases. The bias of innate
potential allowed children to accept dramatic changes over the life span
of a species as biological, and the principle of boundary intensification
restricted children’s acceptance of biological change to within species.
Children’s increase in biological reasoning for the caterpillar item,
above and beyond the other growth & texture/color & shape change
item, the tadpole, reveals the impact that witnessing the life-span change
of a particular category has on biological reasoning about that category.
Witnessing the transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly raised children to near ceiling levels of biological reasoning as they became certain
that part of the caterpillar’s innate potential was transformation into a
butterfly. Children neither witnessed a tadpole become a frog nor seemed
to understand the biological necessity of this transformation. Furthermore,
children in the control group had a relatively poor understanding of biological change compared to children in the intervention group. We feel this
underscores the effect of biological knowledge rather than repeated testing.
This is a clear demonstration of the importance of knowledge when one
reasons about the innate potential and category immutability of biological
categories that undergo dramatic life-span change.
General Discussion
The functioning of essentialism is and has been a fundamental issue for
philosophers, psychologists, and science educators. It may be central
to how we perceive and understand many aspects of natural categories
(Gelman, 2003; Medin & Atran, 2004), taxonomy (Atran, 1998), and evolution (Gelman & Rhodes, 2012). Despite this centrality, little empirical work
has investigated the possibility of a developmental progression in essentialist reasoning or the operation of its distinct components. If essentialist
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reasoning is a barrier to understanding and accepting evolution, it is
important to understand the development of this form of reasoning. In the
current studies, we investigated age-related and experience-related differences in beliefs about innate potential of biological kinds, and the immutability of the identity of biological kinds over transformations in appearance.
We presented 3-, 4- and 7-year-olds with animals that undergo a
variety of life-span changes, from subtle to dramatic, and measured their
essentialist reasoning about these changes, as well as their nonbiological
reasoning about these changes. As in previous studies, all ages of children
relied on biological models for explaining life-span changes more than
nonbiological (magical, psychological) models. All ages of children also
largely rejected the impossible life-span changes (speciation). However,
older children showed more belief in innate potential and immutability
when reasoning about life-span changes, particularly dramatic ones, than
did younger children. This highlights for the first time a developmental
progression in proposed components of essentialist reasoning.
The younger children were then presented with an intervention
during which they witnessed the dramatic life-span change of a caterpillar
becoming a butterfly. After this intervention, their biological reasoning
increased significantly for all life-span changes. This provides strong
evidence that the differences seen between young and old children in Study
1 are likely due to knowledge. This result has important implications for
potentially breaking down some of the barriers to understanding and acceptance of evolution. Specifically, our results suggest that early exposure to
natural biological changes leads to increases in knowledge of the range of
changes that are possible. If this knowledge were accompanied by similar
exposure to a natural range of variations across parents and offspring, one
might be able to stimulate earlier understanding of evolution. Together,
these studies highlight the necessity of real-world experience with living
kinds in order for certain beliefs about biological kinds to manifest.
Additionally, our second study asked whether experience with the
dramatic life-span changes of one particular kind would generalize to
endorsement of life-span changes of other kinds. Children more frequently
endorsed biological mechanisms of life-span change for the item witnessed
during intervention (caterpillar) than for the other items with which they
were presented. This suggests that the knowledge acquired about physical
transformations of living kinds is both transferable and constrained. It is
transferable in that witnessing the biological process of life-span transformation in one species increases confidence in the biological means of lifespan change in related species. Specifically, children learn that appearance
change can be part of the innate potential of certain living kinds, such as
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butterflies. But, this transfer appears to be constrained by knowledge of
the specific changes that are allowable as part of a given organism’s innate
potential. That is, following exposure to caterpillars turning into butterflies,
children did not begin to accept dramatic change for other organisms or
increase their acceptance of nonbiological mechanisms of change.
Similar research by French, Herrmann, Rosengren, and Evans (under
review) supports the findings of this report. These researchers investigated
the endorsement of different models of within-species variation in young
and old children and adults, presenting them with various levels of species
familiarity and of species life-span change. The results revealed that
more dramatic models of within-species variation were supported more
as age increased. The results also revealed that, for unfamiliar categories,
adults defaulted to choosing the growth model even for species that could
be clearly identified as part of a larger class (e.g., insects) that generally
undergoes more dramatic changes over the life span.
It has long been argued that the types of transformations believed to be
possible for any entity are both domain and mechanism specific (Aristotle, cited
in Wiggins, 1987; Keil, 1989; Rosengren et al. 1991; Schwartz, 1978). This study
reveals the knowledge-based, developmental progression with which biological
reasoning emerges, suggesting that what individuals view as acceptable transformations are not only domain and mechanism specific but also dependent upon
knowledge of the biological possibilities in any given category. These results
suggest that, in order to promote a greater understanding of evolution, children
would benefit from hands-on examples of life-span change when learning about
within-species variation, a key concept to understanding evolution.
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